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Performance promises and pitfalls in hybrid organisations: five challenges for managers and 
researchers 
Chris Skelcher and Steven Rathgeb Smith 
 
 
Public and non-profit organisations can contain apparently irreconcilable institutional logics – such as 
public service and market survival. These logics can hybridise to frame the organisation’s work and 
the identity of employees, volunteers and clients in particular ways.  These offer both performance 
promises and performance pitfalls.  We identify five challenges of hybrid organisations for managers 
and researchers: measuring performance, innovation, governance, regulation and sustainability. 
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Hybridity and performance are intimately linked.  Public and non-profit organisations face a 
challenging and turbulent environment characterized by increasing competition for resources, 
higher expectations for accountability and performance, and citizen demands for greater choice on 
services.  This motivates a greater concern with performance in all its aspects.  At the same time, the 
responses to these challenges take public and non-profit organisations away from the traditional 
assumptions about how they should be structured, managed, see their mission and engage with 
other actors.  They have adopted market-like strategies, greater workforce flexibility, corporate 
partnerships, and greater user control over services.  This involves accommodating different sets of 
ideas about management and governance – in other words, hybridisation of traditional and novel 
‘institutional logics’, with their complementary or competing perspectives on performance.   
Hybridity and performance promises…. 
The public and not-for-profit literature often conceives of hybridity too narrowly.  It focuses on novel 
organisational forms mix tasks associated with different sectors, as in the public-private partnership 
or the not-for-profit with a trading subsidiary.  Viewing hybrids in this way is more descriptive than 
analytical.  It does not help us explain what happens when an organisations adopts different tasks or 
ideas about how to improve performance, or prescribe for management and policy.  We conceive of 
hybridity as the working practices, employee identities and organisational structures that arise from 
the contradictions and complementarities between different organising principles or ‘institutional 
logics’ – abstract ideas that have practical force when individuals draw on them to shape and 
legitimise what is valued in the organisation, how it should function, and how it should frame the 
identities of co-workers, citizens, clients and other stakeholders (Thornton et al 2012).    
This way of conceptualising hybrids has two benefits.  First, it brings into focus the real life of 
organisations.  It reveals how practices and ‘rules-in-use’ develop in and around the formal 
structures as individuals seek to resolve the contradictions or tensions between different 
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institutional logics – for example, between public service and market competition (e.g. Sanders and 
McClellan 2014) or public administration and managerialism (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006).  One 
solution may be to structure the organisation so that it separates out competing logics, but this is 
more likely where tensions are not resolvable.  Other times, plural logics may adapt to each other or 
blend into a new normative framework (Skelcher and Smith 2015).    
Secondly, the idea that hybrids involve complementarities and contradictions between institutional 
logics draws attention to the way in which these may be generative of performance promises as well 
as performance pitfalls.  These arise because an institutional logic is inherently normative (Alford 
and Friedland 1985).  In other words, it offers a distinctive idea about what forms of legitimacy, 
authority and identity should be valued.   Each logic then translates into a desired form of 
organisation and working practice, and hence it is possible to infer the performance promise offered 
by that logic (table 1).    
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Table 1. Institutional logics, performance promises and performance pitfalls.  
Institutional 
logic 
Community State Market Profession 
Source of 
legitimacy 
Unity of will; 
belief in trust 
and reciprocity 
Democratic 
participation 
Ability to 
compete 
Personal 
expertise 
Source of 
authority 
Commitment to 
community 
values and 
ideology 
Bureaucratic 
regulation 
Market share Professional 
association 
Source of 
identity 
Emotional 
connection 
Social and 
economic class 
Individual 
consumer 
Quality of craft 
Performance 
promise 
Inclusive and 
responsive 
Serving the 
public interest 
Efficiency Technical 
competence 
Performance 
pitfall 
Emphasis on 
group 
minimises 
hierarchical 
authority 
Emphasis on 
rules reduced 
flexibility 
Low concern 
with 
distributional 
impacts 
Inability to 
reflect wider 
public values 
 
Source: developed by authors from Thornton et al. 2012, p. 73. 
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If we take the notion that each institutional logic offers a performance promise, then we can see 
that their combination – what we call a hybrid – will also have a performance promise (table 2).  The 
ability to mould a hybrid offers the prospect of improved performance as a result of achieving a 
better fit between an organisation’s mission, its form (governance, procedures, structures, and so 
on), and its operating environment (Miller et al 2008).  This is the essence of the development of 
hybrid organisations.  Fundamentally, they are about overcoming the institutional constraints 
imposed by thinking about organisations in ways that are rigidly defined by sectoral or operational 
characteristics.  The organisation is merely a container within which to manage the potential 
tensions between institutional logics.  So the performance promise of hybrid organisations fits 
within the overall NPM and post-NPM move towards greater flexibility in public service 
organisations in order to increase efficiencies and improve outputs and outcomes.   
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Table 2. Hypothesised performance promises and pitfalls of hybridised institutional logics in public 
and non-profit organisations 
 
  Community   
 
State 
Performance 
promise 
Focus on collectivity 
enhances democracy 
  
Performance 
pitfall 
Complexity of rules to 
ensure inclusivity 
Standardization can be 
at variance with local 
knowledge 
 
State 
 
 
Market 
Performance 
promise 
Group orientation  
moderates emphasis 
on individual utility 
Increases flexibility 
of public/non-profit 
organisations 
 
Performance 
pitfall 
Inequitable distribution 
of benefits challenges 
group solidarity  
Organisations 
subverted to private 
ends 
Profit as the guiding 
organizational goal 
 
Market 
 
Profession 
Performance 
promise 
Social goals enriches 
professions’ technical 
focus  
Improves quality of 
delivery 
Increases 
responsiveness of 
professional 
solutions 
Performance 
pitfall 
Tensions between 
technical expertise and 
local knowledge 
Undermines popular 
will 
Reinforces 
individualised view 
of benefits 
 
Source: the authors  
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….. and performance pitfalls 
However, hybrids also hold out the possibility of performance pitfalls precisely because of the 
contradictions and tensions between the logics of which they are composed (table 2).  These arise 
because the hybrid is by definition contravening the existing institutional framework.  For example, 
some English local governments have corporatized functions that they calculate can generate 
additional revenue by competing with the private sector (Skelcher 2015).  Corporatization changes 
the governance structure, and typically moves the function from being located with a ‘state’ logic 
into a ‘market logic’.  But since the municipal company is still within the overall corporate structure 
of the municipality, this new form generates a hybrid ‘state-market’ institutional logic. 
The performance promise offered by this hybridisation is that the change of legal status enables the 
function to trade, generates new incentives on managers, provides them with greater autonomy, 
and has tax and other fiscal advantages for the municipality.  Such hybridisation may comply with 
the legal rules governing public and non-profit organisations, but sits uncomfortably with their 
bureaucratic and regulatory norms.  The resulting performance pitfall is that the company becomes 
subverted to the private ends of its managers, resulting in a zero-sum game in which managers in 
the enterprise seek to maximise their autonomy while the municipality seeks to constrain it.   
The performance promises and pitfalls of hybridization are also evident in the dilemmas posed for 
public and non-profit managers by the current push for performance contracting and so-called ‘Pay-
for-Success’ models of service delivery (Roman, et al. 2014).   Governments and private funders 
expect non-profits to measure and identify their contractual outcomes, which can be significantly at 
variance with their service orientation.  For instance, a non-profit may be established to provide 
workforce training to disadvantaged members of the community, but face performance targets that 
narrowly focus on quick placement in employment—a measure that may require the non-profit to 
significantly alter its programming and staffing requirements (Smith and Lipsky 1993).  Small non-
profit community agencies face special challenges in coping with hybridization.  These agencies 
typically lack a substantial administrative infrastructure and the leadership of the agency including 
the board of directors may lack sufficient expertise in government policy or the for-profit sector.  
Consequently, the management of multiple logics within the organisation can present serious 
difficulties and can contribute to staff and volunteer turnover and internal dissension on agency 
goals and priorities.   
Finally, the ability to achieve the performance promise of hybridisation can be profoundly affected 
by the need for many non-profit (as well as public organisations) to manage the so-called, ‘double-
bottom line’ - to be guided by market and community norms.  This performance pitfall arises from 
the dual logic apparent in social enterprises that intentionally and very purposively incorporate 
market and social norms into their operations.  A common example is a workforce integration social 
enterprise (WISE) in which a local community agency may operate a restaurant staffed by 
disadvantaged individuals who receive training in the restaurant trade as part of their employment 
experience.  But these social enterprises face a delicate dilemma:  they need individuals of a certain 
skill level to work in the restaurant in order for the latter to function effectively; but this 
requirement may inadvertently exclude more disadvantaged individuals from participating in the 
program.  Thus, at least some social enterprises - especially the so-called WISEs (Hasenfeld and 
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Garrow 2012; Pache et al. 2014) - may be most effective in serving the more able of the 
disadvantaged population.    
Managing performance promises and pitfalls in hybrids 
The knotty performance challenges presented by hybridization require managers of public and non-
profit organisations to significantly adapt the staffing and governance of their agencies.  Agencies 
will need to select managers and board members who are sensitive to the complex logics within 
their organizations.  In a more market-oriented environment for public and non-profit agencies, the 
temptation of hiring committees is to seek individuals with business backgrounds as agency 
managers.  However, many non-profit failures or internal dysfunctions can be directly related to the 
tensions between a corporate executive guided by a market logic and the community or professional 
logic of the non-profit organization’s staff or volunteers.   
Managers may also need to be creative with the overall organisational design as this can either help 
or hinder the ability of agency leaders to effectively manage the different mix of logics.  For instance, 
many non-profits are now pressured to raise market income as a strategy for the diversification of 
income.  But the mix of market and public funding can create tension in the organisation.  One 
strategy to manage these tensions is to create a subsidiary for-profit entity so the market logic 
guiding the generation of market income is isolated in this entity rather than incorporated in the rest 
of the organisation.  
Multiple logics can easily collide within the board of directors as well.  Thus, boards with very 
different members who embrace different goals and visions for the organisation can create havoc, 
so many non-profits have created advisory committees and community outreach in order to 
productively engage a wide spectrum of the local community members without promoting internal 
divisions among staff and volunteers.    For instance, many non-profits have created fundraising 
committees to raise revenue so the work of raising philanthropic funds is not solely the 
responsibilities of the board of directors and the staff.  This kind of segmentation separates out the 
multiple logics operant in the organisation and thus potentially reduces the performance pitfalls. 
Five challenges for managers and researchers 
What are the agendas for policy-makers, managers and academics in managing and researching 
performance in hybrid organisations? 
1. Measuring performance  
Public and non-profit organisations are increasingly expected to demonstrate positive outcomes.  
However, many performance regimes associated with performance contracting and social impact 
bonds require non-profits to adopt public priorities (Smith and Phillips 2016).    Further, many non-
profit social enterprises now receive public funding to offer services that often combine market 
income with public priorities (Garrow and Hasenfeld 2012).  These social enterprises are often 
evaluated on the basis of their performance on indicators such as the placement of disadvantaged 
adults in employment.  Yet, little consideration is often given to the social capital and community 
contributions of non-profits.  More attention needs to be devoted to ways in which performance 
management strategies can measure non-profit impact more broadly defined.  This effort would also 
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help non-profit managers and board members manage more effectively the multiple institutional 
logics within the organisation.   
2. Organisational innovation 
Hybridity can be conceptualized as a response of non-profit and public organisations to a turbulent 
and unpredictable environment where revenue diversification is encouraged and market income is 
promoted as a strategy to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Innovation in structure and 
programs reflecting hybridity then is the outcome of an organisational adaptation process (Coule 
and Patmore 2013).  However, hybridity can also be regarded as a cause of innovation:  multiple 
logics within an organisation force the agency to restructure and develop new affiliations and 
subsidiaries in order to adequately cope with the governance and management imperatives of 
hybridity (Smith 2014).    
3.  Governing hybrid organisations 
Management scholars have noted the emergence of collaborative networks among public and 
private organisations - including new policies to integrate local health and social services (Smith 
2016; Kania and Kremer 2011; OECD 2015).  The pressure for collaboration often now co-exists with 
greater competition for resources.  Given these contradictory pressures, non-profit and public 
leaders now need to carefully structure their governance including their boards of directors and 
organisational chart.  Yet many models of non-profit governance are based upon a traditional view 
of non-profits as guided by a community logic.  Research on new models of effective governance 
that allow non-profit leaders to balance competing logics is needed to inform theory and practice in 
non-profit organisations (Skelcher and Smith 2015).   
4.  Regulating hybridity  
Understanding how hybrid organisations should be regulated has lagged substantially behind actual 
practice.  Both public and non-profit organisations have adopted more complex structures to contain 
public service/community and market logics, complicating oversight and accountability.  These 
structures include Community Interest Corporations (CICs) and L3c’s (a new US tax code provision 
for a low profit limited liability company designed to attract private investments and philanthropic 
capital in ventures designed to provide a social benefit).  More research on the regulation of hybrid 
organisations and strategies to ensure accountability, transparency and effectiveness would be very 
useful for policymakers and practitioners.  This type of research could also inform the design of 
regulatory regimes governing non-profit and public organisations. 
5.  Organisational development and sustainability 
Many non-profit organisations are initially established as relatively informal groups and entities 
focused on a particular community of interest (Smith and Lipsky 1993).  As non-profits obtain public 
and private grants and contracts, they tend to formalize and adopt new governance policies and 
procedures.  As non-profits evolve into more mature organisations, they are also likely to be 
encouraged or pressured by funders to adopt more sustainable business models, especially since 
many non-profits in their earlier years depend upon relatively short-term grants and contracts.   In 
this context, hybridity can be regarded as an outcome of the organisational development process, 
with non-profits striving to diversify revenue and engage in new partnerships and collaborations.  
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More research on the relationship between organisational development and the adoption of hybrid 
models would help inform the theory and practice of non-profit and public management.   
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